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ABSTRACT
The nature of work is changing. As labor increasingly trends
to casual work in the emerging gig economy, understanding
the broader economic context is crucial to effective engage-
ment with a contingent workforce. Crowdsourcing repre-
sents an early manifestation of this fluid, laisser-faire, on-
demand workforce. This work analyzes the results of four
large-scale surveys of US-based Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers recorded over a six-year period, providing compa-
rable measures to national statistics. Our results show that
despite unemployment far higher than national levels, crowd-
workers are seeing positive shifts in employment status and
household income. Our most recent surveys indicate a trend
away from full-time-equivalent crowdwork, coupled with
a reduction in estimated poverty levels to below national
figures. These trends are indicative of an increasingly flexible
workforce, able to maximize their opportunities in a rapidly
changing national labor market, which may have material
impacts on existing models of crowdworker behavior.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Human-centered computing→ User studies; • Infor-
mation systems→Crowdsourcing; • Social and profes-
sional topics→ Economic impact.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the nature of work has changed, an increasing proportion
of the US workforce are now engaging in non-economically
driven part-time work [32]. Whether or not work is “eco-
nomically driven” is a function of the availability of work,
rather than the availability of the worker; for example, med-
ical issues, undertaking a course of study, or lack of af-
fordable childcare that reduces availability below “full-time”
would categorize any part-time work as “non-economically
driven” [12]. Further, part-time workers in the emerging gig
economy may be considered part of the contingent work-
force. “Contingent workers are those who don’t have an
implicit or explicit contract for long-term employment.” [28]
Crowdsourcing represents an early manifestation of this
technologically facilitated on-demand workforce typified by
the gig economy [10]. As academic discourse has focused
on improving crowdsourcing models to reduce costs and in-
crease efficiency, the socio-economic status of the workforce
and the impact of these models in a expanding market of
what might otherwise be undertaken as “at-will” employ-
ment [15] has been the subject of little direct investigation.
This work, analyzing the result of four surveys over a
six-year period, focuses on the economic status of US-based
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in the context of national
economic trends. Each survey, with approximately 3,000
unique respondents each, was conducted over the end-of-
the-year festive period for 2012–13, 2013–14, 2016–17, and
2017–18. Our results are presented in the context of two
broad economic measures, unemployment and poverty.
We relate employment status among our participants to
broader economic trends in the market and make observa-
tions on changing worker behavior. Combining the underly-
ing economic markers of household income and household
size, we present estimated poverty rates for crowdworkers
and consider how these vary in the context of broader eco-
nomic trends and an expanding national labor market for
technologically facilitated casual work.
Finally, we consider the impact of these findings on exist-
ing models of crowdworker behavior with a particular focus
on emerging upward pressure on income as workers are able
to consider new opportunities in the broader gig economy.
To allow further analysis of these trends the full anonymized
data-set of more than 10,000 unique respondents is available
at https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.34827
2 BACKGROUND
The gig economy is typified by technologically facilitated on-
demand labor [10]. Crowdsourcing is an established mecha-
nism for rapid recruitment and is recognized as one of the
early manifestations of this sector of the economy [21, 38].
Commercially, crowdsoucing represents the commoditiza-
tion of labor [1]. Inconsistent income typical of this type of
precarious employment [38], with limited practical regula-
tion [13], may have potential impact on worker behavior and
psychology [39].
One facet of research has been determining an appropri-
ate payment for a particular crowdsourced task. The time
commitment and difficulty of the task, available budget, re-
quired quality, expected turn-around time, applicable labor
laws, and a sense of fairness may all be considered before
selecting a price. However, without a fundamental under-
standing of the economic effects of this potentially mutually
beneficial relationship, effective and appropriate pricing re-
mains difficult [23]. Despite significant research carried out
using crowdworkers, the underlying economics of those who
choose to participate is still quite opaque [4].
Understanding worker motivation has been a similar stim-
ulus of related work. In one study the reservation wage of
crowdworkers, the lowest wage at which workers will carry
out the task, has been estimated to be $1.38 per hour for an
on-screen target acquisition task [19]. Measuring workers’
reactions to varied task motivations, Chandler and Kapelner
[8] noted that workers would undertake tasks for an aver-
age hourly wage of $1.34 per hour. Despite these findings
reflecting almost a decade of inflationary pressures, more
recently work by Hara et al. [16] suggests that the median
hourly earnings remain around $2 per hour.
In support of these low payments, Mason and Suri [23]
suggest that most workers are not using Mechanical Turk to
cover necessities, and highlight that working conditions are
determined by the worker. However, Ross et al. [26] report
that US-based Mechanical Turk workers in their 2008–09 sur-
veys earn an average of $2.30 per hour, compared with the
federal minimum of $7.25 per hour [37], and highlight that
14% reported using crowdwork income to cover basic needs.
Their work further indicated that among Indian crowdwork-
ers 27% use this income to cover basic needs [26]. Chen and
Dolan [9] report the still higher figure of 37% of crowdwork-
ers indicating that they use this income to pay for essential
products and services, such as food and utilities.
The ethical position of low-wages for crowdworkers is
muddied by their typical function in the academic commu-
nity as research participants. The status of crowdworkers as
employees and their precise rights with regard to pay is the
subject of academic discourse [10, 13, 23]. However, from a
legal standpoint, the status of Mechanical Turk workers as
members of the workforce is much more concretely defined.
A worker status of “independent contractor” is agreed and
defined by the Mechanical Turk Participation Agreement [2],
while the US Government Accountability Office is clear that
such contractors are members of the “contingent workers”
category [25], and are in the labor force under the Bureau of
Labor Statistics definition.
Employment status is just one of many key economic
markers. Some limited economic considerations are touched
upon by Difallah et al. [11] who take a high-level view of
household income, and a limited look at household size, sam-
pling from the global population over a continuous 28-month
period in their broad review of worker population dynamics
and trends. Similarly, a recent report from the International
Labour Organization has considered the transformative na-
ture of online digital labor platforms in the world of work
with their global survey of 3,500 crowdworkers (1,393 US-
based) carried out in 2015 and 2017 [5].
In contrast, this work focuses on US-based crowdworkers
and analyzes 11,862 responses over a six-year period, sam-
pled at specific fixed points in time. Further, the design and
scale of our work allows this data to be compared to national
figures for the appropriate periods, and allows us to present
our analysis in the context of national economic trends.
3 MEASURING ECONOMIC STATUS
There are a number of commonly considered metrics to
measure an individual’s economic status. Two of the most
broadly reported, and widely understood, are unemployment
or worker status and measures of destitution or poverty. Such
measures in turn encompass a broad range of metrics in-
cluding how the employment itself is categorized, income
levels, household size, and further how these contribute to
standards of living, all in the context of the wider economy.
In the United States, official unemployment figures are re-
leased both monthly and annually and offer a measure of the
proportion of the potential labor force who are out of work.
These figures are gathered by the US Census Bureau and re-
ported by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) [30]. While
unemployment is a widely reported economic measure, it
offers only a superficial view of the economic status of an
individual [39]. For example, a senior consultant between
contracts might have a much more comfortable and secure
economic outlook than a single parent with multiple paid
occupations. Measures of income offer deeper insights into
an individual’s economic well-being [3].
Poverty levels provide a scaled measure useful in assessing
the impact and reality of an individual’s economic status. Offi-
cial figures are computed annually by the US Census Bureau,
offering both a baseline value in dollars, below which house-
holds of a specified size may be considered “in poverty” [18],
and a percentage of the population affected [35] arrived at by
applying these measures to the current population estimates.
To highlight those households who are “at risk” the Census
Bureau provide additional statistics for those below 1.25×
the stated poverty levels highlighting the “near poor” [18].
We consider both unemployment and poverty metrics in our
own surveys.
4 SURVEY DESIGN
This work reports results from four surveys recording the
economic status of respondents using Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). Each survey, with approximately 3,000 unique
respondents, captures broad economicmarkers and this work
considers how the economic makeup of the Mechanical Turk
workforce has changed over a six-year period. The surveys
were carried out over the end-of-the-year festive period for
2012–13, 2013–14, 2016–17, and 2017–18.
Each survey captured approximately 2% of the estimated
150,000 US-based crowdworkers using Amazon Mechanical
Turk [11], representing a sample size far in excess of the
approximately 0.05% of households surveyed in the current
population survey by the US Census Bureau (60,000 [30] of
126 million [34]) and used to generate the Bureau of Labor
Statistics unemployment figures.
The surveys attempt to capture comparable data to na-
tionally produced estimates, in a minimally invasive fashion.
To maximize uptake by workers and ensure a large sam-
ple could be collected in the survey period, the survey was
kept as short as possible. The first survey was made avail-
able on Amazon Mechanical Turk as a single HIT (Human
Intelligence Task) and consisted of six questions:
(1) Age: 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 64+
(2) Gender: Male, Female, Unspecified
(3) Education level: ISCED, 1997 [29]; 0–6
(4) Household income (thousands, USD):
<20, 20–40, 40–60, 60–80, 80–100, 100+
(5) Employment status: as detailed below
(6) Hours using MTurk per week:
<1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10+
The surveys relied on the Mechanical Turk qualification
system to ensure that participants were locatedwithin the US,
and, as required by Amazon’s worker policy, had a minimum
participation age of 18. To allow further post hoc verification
of participant eligibility, and to gain potential further insights
into regional variation, where possible each worker was geo-
located to the state-level based on their IP address.
Each participant was paid $0.05 USD, comparable to con-
temporary surveys in 2012, and this was held constant across
all four surveys for consistency. While the nature of paid-
participation in an economic survey might suggest a sam-
pling bias, previous work has established that neither income
nor household size are contingent factors for engagement in
Mechanical Turk tasks [11].
Measuring Employment Status
Accurately representing an individual’s employment status
can present a number of difficulties. To allow the collected
data to be comparable to nationally recognized statistics we
base our definition of employment on that given by the BLS.
The BLS, in association with the US Census Bureau, uses
an extensive questionnaire involving complex skip patterns
through more than 200 questions to determine employment
status, recognizing that “. . .many of them [respondents] may
not be sure of their actual [employment] classification when
the interview is completed” [30]. To minimize the number
of questions asked, and to maximize participation, we at-
tempted to condense this extensive interrogation and com-
plex definition into a single question, asking participants to
answer yes or no to the following:
Excluding time on Mechanical Turk, in any
one of the last four weeks have you carried out
15 or more hours of paid work, including self-
employed work?
To consider those who were out of work for reasons such
as temporary illness or vacation, we counted those who
worked in any week of the last four as employed, negating a
need for follow-up questioning regarding temporary absence.
Similarly, to minimize participant confusion, we required the
work to be paid despite a limited number of exceptions, such
as farming and working for family businesses [30]. Our use
of 15 hours per week reflects the BLS requirement for such
workers [30]. In the interest of comprehensively evaluating
worker employment status in a single question we included
the 15 hour requirement, despite the BLS acknowledgement
of the small size of this sector of the workforce.
Actual Joblessness
Attempting to capture the various exceptions, exclusions,
and requirements of employment offers a conservative esti-
mate of the employed. However, this risks over-estimating
the unemployment rate among survey respondents.
To avoid this in the 2013–14 survey we expanded our
definition of employment, removing the minimum hourly
requirement and instead explicitly asked how many hours
were worked. To facilitate this change, in all subsequent
surveys, we swapped the order of questions five and six and
modified both questions as follows:
(5) Hours using MTurk per week: <1, 1–5, 6–10,
11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, >35
(6) Excluding timeonMechanical Turk, in any
one of the last four weeks have you under-
taken any paid work, including self-employed
work? (Yes/No)
Maximum hours per week: <1, 1–5, 6–10,
11–15, 16–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, >35
These changes both broadened the definition of employ-
ment to consider any paid work, erring in favour of consid-
ering participants employed rather than unemployed, and
extended the range of the collected data to allow for analy-
sis of workers using Amazon Mechanical Turk as full-time-
equivalent employment.
For question 6, participants were only shown the second
part of the question if they answered “yes” to the first part.
This allowed the number of questions seen to be minimized,
while providing a more detailed breakdown of the workers’
employment status.
Improved Estimates of Economic Status
Economic status is a function not just of employment and
income, but also the number of people supported by that
income. To improve our estimates of economic status in the
2016–17 and later surveys we inserted an additional question,
between 4 and 5, as follows:
(x) People in household: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or more
This change allows for much more robust estimates of
poverty levels, and replicates the USCensus Bureaumeasures
of household size [35]. However, as discussed in the results,
this refinement had little substantive impact on the estimated
levels of poverty.
Despite the modifications made to the survey the comple-
tion time, from accepting to submitting the task, remained
brief and reasonably constant. Workers spent a mean time
of 55 s (sd = 32 s) in 2012–13, 59 s (sd = 36 s) in 2013–14, 51 s
(sd = 27 s) in 2016–17, and 54 s (sd = 26 s) in 2017–18.
5 UNEMPLOYMENT
Measuring unemployment can be complex. The US Bureau
of Labor Statistics uses a complex series of questions to distill
a binary result. By their own admission, those surveyed may
not know their classification at the end of this process [30].
To attempt to encapsulate the BLS definition with a single
question is a significant challenge and capturing the nuances
of the official definition of employment required careful con-
sideration and a revision of our approach.
Unemployment is distinct from joblessness. For example,
someone who depends entirely on retirement income or in-
come from a spouse and is not actively looking for work
would not be considered part of the workforce and would
not be considered in the official unemployment figures [30].
Table 1: Unemployment rate of surveyed US-based MTurk
workers, with contemporary official national figures [31].
Survey Respondents Unemployed (%) National (%)
2012–13 3,049 39.85 7.80
2013–14 3,047 38.56 6.68
2016–17 2,886 31.67 4.75
2017–18 2,880 30.00 4.10
Crowdworkers using Amazon Mechanical Turk are classi-
fied as “independent contractors” by the Mechanical Turk
Participation Agreement [2]. The US Government Account-
ability Office is clear that such contractors are members of
the “contingent workers” category [25], and are in the labor
force under the Bureau of Labor Statistics definition.
It could be argued, that simply by browsing the task listing
on Mechanical Turk our participants are “seeking paid em-
ployment” and by taking our survey all respondents might
be considered “in work.” Such a literal interpretation offers
little insight into workers’ general employment status, and
the practical implications of workers’ broader engagement
in the emerging gig economy.
To tease-apart this distinction and capture employment
status, excepting the use of a paid crowdsourcing as a plat-
form for socio-economic research, we specifically asked par-
ticipants to answer our work-status question by “Excluding
time on Mechanical Turk. . . ”
Table 1 summarizes the estimated unemployment level for
each survey. The measured unemployment rates are 5–7×
higher for the surveyed workers than the nationally reported
figures. However, these results indicate the same downwards
trend noted in national unemployment figures indicating a
reduction in unemployment levels. While the 2012–13 survey
indicates unemployment as the complement of our strict and
restrictive definition of employment, detailed previously, the
result presented is congruent with those of later surveys.
Due to the large sample sizes, and respondents returning
to later surveys, our data offers some longitudinal insights.
For example, our data might also be considered as two pairs
of year-on-year studies: 199 workers participated in both the
2012–13 and 2013–14 survey; 420 workers participated in
both the 2016–17 and 2017–18 survey. In contrast to both
national trends and overall survey responses, unemployment
actually increased for the the 199 respondents over the 2012–
14 period from 34% to 40%. However, for the 420 respondents
for the 2016–18 period unemployment dropped from 34% to
25%, besting the overall figure.
Further, over the course of the six years that these sur-
veys were undertaken, seven workers participated in all
four. Initially, four workers were categorized as unemployed.
However, in the most recent survey all but one of these
seven respondents had taken up other employment. The re-
maining participant was unique in remaining classied as
unemployed in each of the four surveys. Additional cross-
referenced groupings can be found in, and generated from,
the accompanying data le.
Hours Using Amazon Mechanical Turk
While the indicative unemployment rates among the respon-
dents are much higher than national estimates, many work-
ers report spending substantial time using the platform. Fig-
ure 1 shows the percentage of respondents using the plat-
form for at least x hours per week. As detailed earlier, for
the 2012–13 survey, workers were limited to reporting up to
“10+ hours.”
For subsequent surveys, 5–7% of workers report working
on the platform 35 or more hours per week, which would
place them in the full-time employment category under BLS
definitions [30]. Further, 7–10% of respondents indicate using
the platform in excess of 30 hours per week, which may
entitle them to employer-subsidized health-care under the
Affordable Care Act had they been pursuing similar hours in
traditional employment [24].
While an increasing hourly usage of the platform among
respondents was established in the first three surveys, the
most recent 2017–18 survey indicates a reversal of this trend.
This may be indicative of a more competitive recruitment
environment in the rapidly expanding gig economy, with
many more, and potentially higher paying, worker-directed
casual employment opportunities.
Reflecting the trends seen in the the overall figures, the
199 repeat respondents from the 2012–14 period reported an
increase from 31% to 41% using the platform for 10+ hours
per week. However, the 2016–18 period showed a slowing,
rather than reversal, of the trend toward increasing hours
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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents reporting using MTurk
at least x hours per week.
b the 2012–13 survey uses the reported value; maximum “10+ hours.”
with a modest increase from 51% to 52% reporting using
MTurk 10+ hours per week among these 420 respondents.
Of our seven workers who participated in all four surveys,
the number of hours spent using Mechanical Turk remained
fairly stable in the region of 11–20 hours per week. However,
once these workers undertook alternative employment, their
reported number of hours spent using the Mechanical Turk
platform typically decreased.
In addition to representing a small subset of the respon-
dents, as a group of workers who have continued to engage
with the platform over a six-year period, the hourly commit-
ment of these seven workers is higher than the workforce at
large. Overall, all respondents reported a median time com-
mitment of 6–10 hours per week. This lower typical level of
usage might be expected from the broader population which
has been estimated to have a worker replacement rate of 50%
every 400 days [11], and suggests an overall workforce with
limited long-term commitment to the platform.
6 POVERTY
The coarse household income brackets used to minimize the
invasiveness and encourage uptake make accurate estimates
of poverty challenging. Beginning with household income,
and combining with other known measures including in-
come distribution and household size, allows us to calculate
estimates of poverty among the workforce.
Household Income
Income represents the market value of labor and, for many
workers, is an important socio-economic marker. Figure 2
summarizes the percentage of respondents reporting house-
hold income in each bracket for the four surveys. Figure 2
highlights the broad trend: a decrease in respondents indicat-
ing household income in the lower brackets, and an increase
11.7
14.2
20.9
21.6
21.8
23.6
24.4
27.1
22.0
22.1
22.8
19.9
17.6
16.9
13.5
13.1
10.0
9.5
8.6
8.0
16.8
13.7
9.7
10.2
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2017–18
2016–17
2013–14
2012–13
0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 80–100 100+
Figure 2: Percentage of surveyed MTurk workers reporting
household income in each bracket (thousands, USD).
of those in the higher brackets. This trend is representative of
the national household income figures, as reported by the US
Census Bureau [36], which show a similar but more marked
movement from the lower to the higher income brackets.
Considering the year-on-year changes, for both the 2012–
14 and 2016–18 periods, workers who participated in both
surveys from each show a median reported household in-
come of $40,000–60,000. However, similar to the overall trend
identified, workers did report an increase in income. For the
2012–14 period the proportion of the 199 respondents re-
porting a household income of less than $40,000 dropped
from just under 50% to 48%. Similarly, in the 2016–18 period
the proportion of the 420 respondents reporting a household
income of less than $40,000 dropped from 37% to 35%
All but one of our seven workers who completed all four
surveys reported an increase in household income. This rise
is expected when considered in concert with the increasing
level of employment among this sub-sample. The sole excep-
tion, who reported remaining in the $20,000–40,000 bracket
in each of the four surveys over the six-year period, being
the worker consistently reporting unemployment.
The US Census Bureau [36] provides estimates of the num-
ber of households for each income bracket in intervals of
$5,000 from $0–250,000+. These statistics are further en-
hanced by given means in each bracket. Using these more
detailed figures, a reasoned model of the income distribution
for the cohort can be computed, based on this distribution.
Previous work has shown that using interpolated cumu-
lative distribution functions (CDFs) with mean matching
offers a more accurate approach to estimating income sta-
tistics from binned data than fitting continuous parametric
distributions or using the bin midpoint [17]. While the US
Census Bureau typically uses a simple linear interpolation
between the minimum and maximum value in each inter-
val [14], which assumes a constant population distribution
within each income interval, this approach offers a more
nuanced view of income distribution.
As seen in the companion data file, applying this computed
national income distribution model to the cohort generally
indicates a higher estimated income for these otherwise low-
income workers, in particular when compared with simple
linear interpolation, and acknowledges the reality of income
distribution rather than arbitrarily assuming a particular
value for each bracket or an artificial uniform distribution.
Household Size
Poverty is also a function of household size. Having per-
respondent reporting of household size allows for improved
poverty estimates to be calculated, using the appropriate
poverty threshold. In the 2016–17 and 2017–18 surveys, where
household size was gathered, responses reveal that mean
household size is marginally higher for survey respondents
Table 2: Mean reported household size of respondents with
contemporary official national figures [34].
Survey Mean household size National
2012–13 – 2.55
2013–14 – 2.54
2016–17 2.68 2.53
2017–18 2.77 2.54
than the official national figures for the same period (see
Table 2). However, where individual figures are unavailable
the national mean provides reasonably approximate values
for the cohort.
Due to the later inclusion of this question, household size
is unavailable for the 2012–14 period, however for the 420
respondents for the 2016–18 period the mean reported house-
hold size increased from 2.57 to 2.61. Similarly, the mean
household size among the seven respondents to all four sur-
veys showed a slight increase in 2017–18. One respondent
reported adding two household members, while another re-
ported a reduction by one.
The varied reason for changes in household size, such
as the forming and breaking of relationships, the birth and
departure of children, or even deaths of household members,
make these shifts difficult to contextualize without more
invasive and unnecessary questioning.
Estimating Poverty
The coarse household income brackets, used to minimize the
invasiveness and encourage uptake, make accurate estimates
of poverty challenging. For example: for a respondent to our
2017–18 survey reporting a household size of three and an
income of $0–20,000 USD, it is not possible to state with
absolute certainty whether or not this household would be
categorized as in poverty by the US Census Bureau, as the
2017 threshold for a three-person household was $19,515 [35].
However, for a reported household size of four, within the
same income bracket, we could categorically classify such a
household as in poverty as the 2017 threshold was $25,094
for a four-person household [35]. These categories and clas-
sifications, however, do provide minimum and maximum
bounds for poverty measures.
Using the more detailed income estimates, derived from
income distribution figures as described earlier, it is possible
to calculate a reasoned representative value. Figure 3 shows
both the estimated poverty levels of the survey respondents
and the official figures for the corresponding end-of-year
at 1.0× and 1.25× the official national poverty thresholds
(in poverty and the near poor [18]). The error bars indicate
the minimum and maximum bounds, as a percentage of the
cohort, which can be categorically classified in each group.
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Error bars show minimum and maximum for the cohort; prior to 2016–17,
estimates based on national average household size. gNational figures [35].
Prior to 2016–17, these estimates are dependent on national
average household size and as such have a much broader
range. For the latter surveys, requesting household size, we
are able to offer higher accuracy estimates and narrower
minimum and maximum bounds to these estimates.
The 2012–13 and 2013–14 surveys both indicated a higher
poverty level among Mechanical Turk workers compared
to the national population, however, both the 2016–17 and
2017–18 surveys indicate poverty levels below the national
figures. While the addition of a specific question regarding
household size does improve the bounds, continuing to apply
the official mean household size to the 2016–17 and 2017–18
surveys results in poverty estimates that are all within 1.1% of
those seen in Figure 3. This marked change of circumstance,
coupled with the reduced commitment to the platform seen
in Figure 1, may reflect the increase in the availability of
alternative casual employment opportunities.
Due to the coarse income brackets in our data, and the
nature of population-level estimation of income distribution
and household size, calculation of year-on-year changes is
problematic. However, for completeness, none of the seven
respondents who participated in all four surveys would be
classified as in povertyby the US Census Bureau by 2017–18.
The single participant who continued to report an income
bracket of $20,000–40,000 throughout the six-year period
may be near poorat the 2017 1.25× threshold of $24,394 for
a three-person household [35].
7 BROADER ECONOMIC TRENDS
The unemployment rate is down [31] and Americans are
richer than ever before [36]. While these broad economic
trends are captured in these surveys, the rates of improve-
ment lag the national figures. Between 2016–17 and 2017–18
unemployment among respondents dropped by 5.3% year-
on-year, while the national figure saw a relative drop of 13.7%
(see Table 1). For 2016–17, 13.7% of respondents indicated a
household income in excess of $100,000 (Figure 2); nationally
that figure is over twice as high at 27.7% [36].
Crowdwork represents one of the earliest forms of what
is now colloquially known as the gig economy, a technologi-
cally facilitated manifestation of non-economically driven
part-time work [10]. Over the last 10 years the number of
US workers engaged in non-economically driven part-time
work has increased by 10.1%, from a mean of 19.3 million in
2008 to a mean of 21.3 million in 2018 [32].
While national economic data highlights an increasing
wealth-divide among Americans [33], the rich are getting
richer but, crucially, the poor are also getting less poor. De-
creased unemployment, and the fluidity of labor between
uncontracted laisser-faireopportunities in gig economy type
jobs could be a contributory factor to the reduced estimated
poverty rates for respondents in the 2016–17 and 2017–18
surveys, which are lower than the population at large. In
essence, those applying themselves to these new forms of
work may be better able to capitalize on increased opportu-
nities in a turbulent growth-driven economy.
Conversely, these new labor markets do have drawbacks
for those who participate in them. While traditional employ-
ers typically provide a suitable working environment, tools,
facilities, and consumables they may also offer a range of
benefits to their employees: tax-deductible retirement con-
tributions; subsidized food, housing and clothing; employee
loans or discount schemes; and crucially, health-care. As
highlighted earlier, 7–10% of survey respondents indicate
using the Mechanical Turk in excess of 30 hours per week
which may entitle them to employer subsidized health-care
under theAordable Care Act, had they been pursuing similar
hours in traditional employment [24].
Further, it is important to recall that “non-economically
driven” part-time workers include those who undertake part-
time work for reasons including medical issues, undertak-
ing a course of study, or lack of affordable childcare [12]. It
does not consider the individuals’ need for income, as all
workers in the workforce are expected to be participating
for remuneration. Part-time work is only considered “in-
voluntary” or “economically driven” due to slack economic
conditions or lack of available full-time jobs [12]. However,
the expanding segment of the job market that is now filled
by gig economy positions may impact this categorization.
For example, a pizza delivery driver may previously have
been taken on as full-time-equivalent employee, however in
the gig economy these roles are increasingly being offered
only through providers such as GrubHub where workers are
classified as contractors, denying the protections and bene-
fits of traditional employment. This change in the makeup
of job availability may have an increasingly turbulent effect
on employment figures during economic downturns.
The known disconnect between economic markers, includ-
ing household income, and worker propensity to undertake
Mechanical Turk tasks [11] further suggests that expansion
of the gig economy may encourage workers to undertake
contingent work, and opportunistic behavior may be a nec-
essary and fundamental characteristic of the workforce.
Potential Impact on Worker Models
Income is an important factor for those undertaking crowd-
work. Workers rank, compare, and boast of their earnings in
informal online forums [22]. While some work suggests that
altruism, enjoyment, or spending free time are more domi-
nant drivers [23], Mechanical Turk workers expect to be paid
for their contributions [4]. The importance of this income
to the workforce remains a matter of debate [9, 21, 23, 26],
and the impact of researchers themselves on marketplace
characteristics raises varied ethical considerations.
The ease of which automated application of crowd intelli-
gence can be applied to computationally difficult problems
was raised by Bederson and Quinn [4] in their guidelines
for fostering positive relationships between the requesters
and workers using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Later work by
Salehi et al. [27] considered the ability for the workforce to
effect change, building a platform on which these workers
could gather and stand to promote their views. The project1
saw early success in promoting Guidelines for Academic Re-
questers, however it lists no new motions in the last year.
Workers may have a sense of identity through associa-
tion with the platform [21]. However, as the broader mar-
ket for casual labor continues to develop, workers who feel
subjugated by the platform are able to pursue a variety of
viable alternatives. Between August 20112 and October 20183
Amazon continued to promote Mechanical Turk as having a
worker population of “more than 500,000” suggesting limited
or stagnant growth over the 7-year period. Recent work by
Difallah et al. [11], using capture-recapture modeling of the
workforce, suggests the number may be as low as 100,000.
The improving economic fortunes and reduced enthusi-
asm for the platform may have impacts on how researchers
model worker behavior. The changing nature of work means
that workers now have alternative casual employment op-
portunities in gig economy jobs. Previous work suggesting
typical earnings of no more than $2 per hour [8, 16, 19] need
to consider not only inflationary pressures, but also the de-
creasing attractiveness of low-wage tasks for a workforce
who have a demonstrably higher hourly worth.
1 http://www.wearedynamo.org
2 https://web.archive.org/web/201108/https://requester.mturk.com/tour
3 https://web.archive.org/web/201810/https://requester.mturk.com/tour
In research applications, including in HCI, crowdsourcing
has long been identified as a mechanism for rapid, low-cost
user studies and data acquisition tasks [20]. With increasing
opportunities for contingent workers in the gig economy
both the availability of workers, as they reduce hours, and
the increasingly unattractive rates paid may erode these ad-
vantages of Mechanical Turk. While a small pool of altruistic
and intrinsically driven workers are likely to continue using
crowdlabor platforms, these low-cost workers will be in high
demand and may be less representative of the population as
a whole. Researchers may have to reconsider the appropri-
ateness of their task not just from a technological and ethical
position, but also from an increasingly economically driven
one: both for the researcher and the participant.
This increased fluidity of the workforce may also impact
the practical application of crowdlabor. Previous work, such
as the Soylent text editor [7], highlighted the ability to keep
workers on retainer at extremely low-cost to provide es-
sentially instantaneous worker availability [6, 7]. Models of
worker behavior that depend on, or suggest, a ready and
waiting workforce may be be disrupted by more attractive
employment opportunities in the developing causal labor
market as even the most committed long-term workers show
a reduction in hours spent using crowdsourcing platforms.
8 CONCLUSION
Crowdsourcing represents an early manifestation of the tech-
nologically facilitated, laisser-faire, on-demand workforce
typical of the so-called gig economy. This work has ana-
lyzed the results of four large-scale surveys of US-based
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Each survey sampled
approximately 3,000 workers; in total over 10,000 unique
crowdworkers over a six-year period.
Our results show that unemployment among the surveyed
crowdworkers is far higher than national levels. However,
crowdworkers are seeing limited positive shifts in employ-
ment status and household income, even where these may
lag national trends. Our most recent surveys indicate a move
away from full-time-equivalent crowdwork, coupled with
a reduction in estimated poverty levels to below national
figures. These trends are indicative of an increasingly flexible
workforce, able to maximize their opportunities in a rapidly
changing national labor market.
As national unemployment levels continue to fall and the
casual labor market continues to expand, crowdworkers are
able undertake alternative employment in the contingent
worker category. These behavioral changes have the poten-
tial for material impact to existing crowdworker models as
workers are able to opportunistically move from task to task
and job to job, no longer tied to a specific platform or role,
to capitalize on their flexibility and maximize their income
in the emerging modern gig economy.
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